Prisoner\u27s Clothing during Trial by Mukai, Christine
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1971
Prisoner's Clothing during Trial
Christine Mukai
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christine Mukai, Prisoner's Clothing during Trial, 20 Clev. St. L. Rev. 391 (1971)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss2/16
Prisoner's Clothing During Trial
Christine Mukai*
M ADISON AVENUE BOMBARDS the American consumer with "sug-
gestions" for the purchasing subconscious. The goal, the sale of a
product, is reached quite regularly. The process entails the human sub-
conscious, which is so apparently susceptible to the power of suggestive
influence. The subconscious assimilates the appeals it receives and re-
sponds in terms of affirmative actions and/or opinions. Quaere, is the
process of criminal justice rightfully left to a suggestively damning in-
fluence cast, at trial, by the form of a prison uniform? That is, should
criminal justice and a defendant's constitutional rights be subjected to
the prejudicial influence that penal attire may have upon the human
mind? Just as a smartly-packaged product sings out Buy Me Buy Me
to the consumer's subconscious, does a prison uniform sing out Guilty
Guilty to a juror's subconscious?
This paper will deal with the appearance, vis-a-vis clothing, of a
criminal defendant and the right of that defendant not to be attired in
prison garb during judicial proceedings. The purpose here is not to con-
sider the practices of the various jurisdictions; rather this shall be an
attempt to display the existence and implications of the right to stand
trial in non-criminating clothing.
The Cloak of Innocence
The term is said to derive from two sources, "Apparel" from the
Latin "ad" meaning to and "par" meaning equal, to point out the
means by which outwardly one keeps even or in line with his
group or class. (emphasis added) 1
The accusatorial system of criminal justice presumably practiced in
the United States highly favors the oft-repeated phrase, a man is "in-
nocent until proven guilty." To this end, courts have variously agknowl-
edged the correctness of such a conclusion with regard to the right here
involved. 2 However, are garments which are conspicuously, obviously
* B.A., University of Hawaii; Third-year student at Cleveland State University Col-
lege of Law.
1 In re Steimes' Estate, 270 N.Y.S. 339, 150 Misc. 279, as cited in Black's Law Diction-
ary 123 (4th ed. 1951).
2 Specifically courts have discussed the possibility that the appearance of a prison-
uniformed defendant gives an appearance of guilt. Commonwealth v. Keeler, 216 Pa.
Super. 193, 264 A. 2d 407 (1970); Brooks v. State, 381 F. 2d 619 (5th cir. 1967); Sharpe
v. State, 119 Ga. App. 222, 166 S.E. 2d 645 (1969); Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo. 488, 174
P. 2d 717 (1946); People v. Shaw, 381 Mich. 467, 164 N.W. 2d 7 (1969) (dissent of Kava-
nagh, J.), aff'd. 7 Mich. App. 187, 151 N.W. 2d 381; People v. Zapata, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171
(D.CA. 1963); O'Halloran v. Rundle, 266 F. Supp. 173 (D.C. Pa. 1967), aft'd, 384 F. 2d
997 (1967), cert. den. 393 U.S. 860, 21 L. Ed. 2d 128, 89 S. Ct. 138 (1968).
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prison uniforms3 "cloaks of innocence" such that a defendant wearing
such clothing qualifies as "innocent until proven guilty"?
Is the law so obtuse that clothing, "apparel," as defined above,
would be viewed as being of insignificant effect on the defendant's rights?
Where a defendant is forced4 to wear prison clothing in the presence
of a jury at a trial (or at a voir dire), can it be properly concluded that
no prejudicial harm to the defendant's case accrues?
Undeniably, for a jury or other lay body to view a defendant in
clothing, conspicuously that of a penal institution, adds to the prosecu-
tion's arsenal in a subtle manner. Jurors are necessarily subjected to
viewing the prison uniform. It is probable that such garb will be of in-
terest to and perhaps stir a morbid curiosity in the individual jurors.
Through the various channels of mass media and entertainment sources,
jurors probably have a preconceived idea of what a prison uniform looks
like. However, the impact of the official atmosphere, of what may be
a first-time, first-hand observation of a prison uniform and a criminal
defendant, cannot be measured. The reaction and association capacities
of the human mind can and do, consciously and subconsciously, draw
conclusions. The reaction of the juror is likely to be a negative one,
and perhaps result in a hostile attitude towards the defendant; the
juror may equate the uniform to guilt and the trial to formality. The
supposed cloak of innocence suffers as a result. Hence, before the
prosecutor utters a single syllable, the prison uniform can actually take
the defendant a step toward conviction. Certainly, such a conclusion
can be shrugged off and scoffed at as mere conjecture. But which at-
torney can deny that jurors do not always follow what they should
or what they are expected to follow?
But what of this "cloak of innocence"? Is it a substantive right or
merely a discretionary, procedural matter? The concept of a "cloak of
innocence" is such an ingrained parameter of criminal justice that
where the right to appear innocent is concerned, presumptions which
would aetract from the viability of the right must be avoided. The right
involved is such a substantive and particular one that its violation
necessarily results in prejudicial proceedings, regardless of any find-
ing that the rest of the trial was fair and non-prejudicial or that facts
3 For judicial description and acknowledgment of the distinctive appearance of
prison clothing, see: Keeler, Eaddy, Shaw, supra, n. 2; also United States v. Social
Service Dept., 263 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Watt v. State, Okl. Cr., 450 P. 2d 227
(1969); French v. State, Okl. Cr., 416 P. 2d 171 (1966); Dennis v. Dees, 278 F. Supp.
354 (E.D. La. 1968), reversing State v. Dennis, 250 La. 125, 194 S. 2d 720 (1967);
People v. Garcia, 269 P. 2d 673 (D.C.A. Cal. 1954); Xanthull v. State, Tex. Cr. 403
S.W. 2d 807 (1966); State v. Woods, 179 Kan. 601, 296 P. 2d 1114 (1956).
4 Of cases found on the subject, in only one instance did a defendant choose prison
clothing over his own. Thomas v. State, 451 S.W. 2d 907, 909 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970),
where the court said "He preferred to wear the jail clothing, because he thought his




seem to support the jury's finding anyway.5 The idea involved incor-
porates the role of the jury. If an uncontrolled influence is thrust upon
the jury and there is uncertainty as to the prejudicial effects of such in-
fluence, it is manifestly unfair to refuse to recognize the possibility of
prejudicial influence. Inference of guilt is not enough.
Yet is it a valid assumption that the cloak of innocence, (and the
right not to appear in prison garb) is not a mere procedural right, but
one based on a substantive right? The answer, simply, must be yes.
Courts have said that the right is a mere procedural one, with the
court or other authority having discretionary power to determine
whether or not a defendant may wear civilian rather than prison
clothing.6 Other courts have intimated that the right exists but is a
waivable one, such that untimely assertion of that right estops future
claims7 or that defense counsel, in any event, should have done some-
thing about the matter at a point earlier in proceedings.8 In finding no
prejudicial effects on defendants' cases, courts have said that objection
to prison apparel made on appeal is not soon enough.9 Neither are
objections made at the beginning of trial.10 Even a pre-trial objection is
not sufficient." In the interest of a more uniform application of rights
relating to prejudicial proceedings, when is sooner, if not after, during
or even before trial? Or should the matter be left to those courts which
mention but do not ever answer the question?
12
Where it is the subconscious of the jury that is involved and a sit-
uation prevails such that a defendant may be better off not appearing
in court at all (rather than be the subject of a prejudicial display), the
mere procedural question, if indeed one exists, should be dispensed
with as subservient to the higher ethics of criminal justice. If we say
that a man is innocent until proven guilty, then why cannot the sup-
posed cloak of innocence be assured to an individual separate and apart
from the pettiness of procedural discretion? The very system which
5 Sharpe, supra n. 2; Shultz, infra n. 14; Yates, infra n. 6.
6 Sharpe and Shaw, supra n. 2; Xanthull, supra n. 4; Yates v. Peyton, 207 Va. 91, 147
S.E. 2d 767 (1966).
7 Sharpe and Shaw, supra, n. 2; Watt, supra n. 3; Yates, supra, n. 6; Clark v. State,
195 S. 2d 786 (Sup. Ct. Ala. 1967); People v. Du Bose, 89 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1970).
8 State v. Bentley, 472 P. 2d 864 (Sup. Ct. Mont. 1970); Sharpe, and Shaw, supra n. 2;
State v. Hendrick, 164 N.W. 2d 57 (Sup. Ct. N.D. 1969); Du Bose and Clark, supra,
n. 7; Yates, supra n. 6.
9 Claxton v. People, 434 P. 2d 407 (Sup. Ct. Colo., 1967); Watt, supra, n. 3; Wilkinson
v. State, 423 S.W. 2d 311 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968); Yates, supra n. 6; also Du Bose, supra
n. 6, which says the same though the matter was raised in conference with the trial
judge.
10 Sharpe and Shaw, supra n. 2; Garcia and Xanthull, supra n. 3; Clark, supra n. 6;
State v. Wilwording, 394 S.W. 2d 383 (Sup. Ct. Mo., 1965).
11 Collins v. State, 70 Okl. Cr. 340, 106 P. 2d 273 (1949).
12 People v. Arntson, 10 Mich. App. 718, 160 N.W. 2d 386 (1968); State v. Abbott, 21
Utah 2d 307, 445 P. 2d 142 (1968).
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (2)
grants the "innocence" seems to seek to infringe and, in some in-
stances, to erase the right entirely.
A defendant would not ordinarily prefer to appear guilty. Surely
a guilty plea could be employed to such end. But where no guilty
plea is entered, then it is the role and duty of the prosecution to prove
the defendant guilty by relevant evidence and testimony, to the satis-
faction of a jury. Irrelevant and prejudicial evidence are so labelled for
a reason. Should such evidence be allowed into the trial, against the
spirit of the accusatorial system of criminal justice and contrary to a
definitive parameter of the system? How farcical a justice is one which
would seek to itself perpetuate injustice.
The mind of the layman in the jury box is not educated to discern
between the prejudicial and non-prejudicial evidence it received during
the course of a trial. To this end, cases such as Turner v. Louisiana
13
are decided, having stated that a jury cannot be subjected to possible
influence or prejudicial associations during the course of trial. Few
things would seem to be more prejudicial to a presumption of innocence
than is a prison uniform.
Every person is presumed to be innocent of the commission of
crime and that presumption follows them through every stage of
the trial until they shall have been convicted. 14
The presumption of innocence requires the garb of innocence . . .15
The Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . .
an impartial jury...16
The jury is a very basic part of the criminal justice process, for
the Constitution 17 grants criminal defendants the right to an impartial
jury. That means not any jury, but a jury without prejudice so far as
prejudice can be detected by the very practical, protective and tactical
voir dire.18 This is not to say that a totally prejudice-free jury is guar-
anteed, or that a favorably disposed jury will result. However, as to a
given case and a specifically identified defendant the voir dire process
attempts to select jurors who would best serve the particular case by
elimination of individuals because of discernible, detected or suspected
13 379 U.S. 466 (1965), where a jury deliberated in the custody of deputies who had
offered important testimony at the trial.
14 Shultz v. State, 131 Fla. 757, 179 S. 764, 765 (1938).
15 Eaddy, supra n. 2 at 718.
16 U.S. Constitution, Amend. VI. The right to an impartial jury is extended to state
proceeding, incorporated into the due process clause of the 14th amendment, Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. ed. 2d 491 (1968).
17 Id.
18 Recognizing of course that some citizens are precluded from juror eligibility by




prejudices. Peremptory and regular challenges are provided for this
purpose so that both prosecution and defense have the opportunity to
examine prospective jurors and either accept or challenge such indi-
viduals as jurors.
Once a jury is formed, it cannot be said that either prosecution or
defense had a more influential hand in selecting the jury, barring of
course, any misdeed in the selection of the jury panel or other systematic
exclusion of certain types of members of the community. 19 Thus theo-
retically the jury as selected by fair process is essentially an impartial
body upon whose wisdom and judgment the outcome of legal proceed-
ings will depend, in keeping with the Constitutional mandate of jury
trial and impartial jury.
Thus, it is left to the prosecution and defense to present their re-
spective cases to the jury. The evidence, testimony and argument of
each side and the court's charge generally constitute the material
upon which jury deliberation is based, along with impressions and in-
terpretations the jury itself gathers in the course of the trial. If it is
only up to the prosecution and defense to present evidence in a trial,
then truly any other influence 20 is prejudicial per se.
During trial the jury essentially is subjected to two sales pitches.
It is clear that a myriad of impacts is made upon the jury in the
process. Just as pre-trial publicity can be found prejudicial, 21 why
cannot an equally external but more insidious influence upon the re-
spective psyches of the jurors be likewise found to be prejudicial? When
the criminal process forces a defendant to wear prison clothing at the
trial, the probability of negative psychological impact on the jury is too
powerful to overlook. Under the circumstances, the juror or venireman
who views the obviously prison-uniformed 2 defendant cannot be ex-
pected not to react to the visual stimulus, regardless of inadvertency
or innocent intent. The suggestive quality of the influence remains as
part of the impressions made on the jurors, impressions which will later
be applied to the deliberative process. As one court said:
A defendant in prison garb gives the appearance of one whom the
state regards as deserving to be so attired. It brands him as con-
victed in the state's eyes. It insinuates that the defendant has been
arrested not only on the charge being tried but also on other
charges for which he is being incarcerated .... in no case should
19 Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954),
holding unconstitutional systematic exclusion of qualified persons from jury panels
on the basis of color, national origin or descent.
20 For example, pretrial publicity, Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 77 S. Ct. 205,
14 L. ed. 2d 204 (1963).
21 Id.
22 Supra, n. 3.
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appellant have undergone the severe prejudice of appearing before
the jury as this man was required. (Emphasis added.) 23
It is the duty of the system of criminal justice to provide the im-
partial jury. When that same system provides the "impartial" jurors
with extrabrdinarily suggestive but irrelevant "evidence" as to the status
of defendant, it is patently obvious that the system has failed to provide
an impartial body. What may have been an impartial body once is
rendered incompetent by the failure of that system to protect the prose-
cution, the jury and primarily, the defendant, from prejudicial influence.
There is nothing sacrosanct about the acts of the system. Prejudicial in-
fluence on anyone's part is nevertheless prejudicial. Furthermore,
prejudice is not impartial. It cannot be.
The Fifth Amendment
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself.24
Thus, the concept of a privilege against self-incrimination is guar-
anteed. However, the privilege has limitations; it is generally applied
where testimonial, communicative evidence is involved, as opposed to
physical evidence. For example, handwriting, 25 appearing and speaking
at police lineups,26 and blood, urine and breath samples 27 are evi-
dential areas which long have been held to be immune from the privi-
lege of self-incrimination. However, involuntary confessions are held
to be inadmissible under the same right.28  (As to defendants being
required to wear prison clothing during judicial proceedings, a conflict
exists. 29 )
23 Keeler, supra n. 2 at 409.
24 U.S. Constitution, Amend. V. States generally have equivalent provisions. How-
ever, under Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation was incorporated into the 14th amendment due process of law clause and held
applicable to State proceedings.
25 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 St. Ct. 195, 18 L. ed. 2d 1178 (1967).
26 U. S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. ed. 2d 1149 (1967).
27 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. ed. 2d 908 (1966).
28 Brain v. U.S., 168 U.S. 532, 18 S. Ct. 183, 42 L. ed. 568 (1897) as to inadmissibility
in Federal courts. This was extended to State courts in Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 183, 80 L. ed. 682 (1936).
29 For the time being the conflict shall remain for the Supreme Court has yet to
speak on the matter. It denied certiorari in O'Halloran v. Rundle, 266 F. Supp. 173
(E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd. 384 F. 2d 997 (1967), cert. den., 393 U.S. 860, 21 L. Ed. 2d 128,
89 S. Ct. 138 (1968), where the lower court said, regarding Collins v. State (supra,
n. 11) (prison garb at trial): "In . . . (that case) however, the appearance of the
defendant before the jury otherwise than as a presumptively innocent citizen served
no probative purpose." O'Halloran concerned fingerprinting during trial. In uphold-
ing such action, the court distinguished Collins on the evidential bearing of such
prosecution action. So, the Supreme Court has neither ruled on the question or even





The distinction drawn by such cases as far as the protection
of the privilege is not primarily relevant to the question at hand.
The undesirable effect here is entirely based on irrelevant concerns.
The fact that a defendant is in prison attire, under the doctrine of in-
nocent until proven guilty, has no factual relation to the crime charged.30
It is unnecessary to the proper prosecution of a criminal case that a de-
fendant be attired in prison garb. Furthermore, it is highly unfair and
prejudicial to a defendant to have to stand trial3' or to appear at the
voir dire 32 in a prison uniform.
The evil of requiring a defendant to wear a prison uniform takes
several courses. Among them, a defendant is demeaned and placed at a
psychological disadvantage during his "fair" trial.33 The defendant by
the time of the voir dire and actual trial has already been singled out
as the central character giving rise to the trial. Regardless of any prior
proceedings, the accused nevertheless is deemed innocent. It is in-
herently unjust to demean an innocent man while he is credited with
theoretical innocence. Appearing in a prison uniform in court before a
jury makes the defendant even more conspicuous than he otherwise
would be. Can a system of justice presume to place the defendant in
a more psychologically demoralizing state "in his own mind" 34 apart
from any reaction of any other party?
Another effect is a stronger, more serious argument against the
practice. That is, the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimi-
nation is not only offended but flagrantly violated. If in his wildest imagi-
nation 35 a juror can be said to be susceptible to the visible stimulus of a
prison uniform and acquire, as a result, a bias against the defendant,
then justice cannot tolerate forcing a defendant to appear in prison at-
tire. In effect, the defendant is being forced to give evidence against
himself, in direct contradiction of the Fifth Amendment. The bias ac-
cruing may well be immune from an effective defense, for the result-
ing bias will relate not to any real connection between the defendant
and the crime, or any prosecution attempt to relate the defendant to the
crime, but will relate only to mental processes of jurors acting upon ir-
relevant data. Although some courts rely on a judge's charge to the
jury3 6 to neutralize the effect, the insidious working of such mental
30 Keeler, supra n. 2; Dennis, supra n. 3, Brooks v. State, supra, n. 2.
31 Keeler and Eaddy, supra n. 2; Brooks, supra n. 2, Dennis, supra n. 3; Shaw dis-
sent, supra n. 2.
32 Shaw dissent, supra n. 2; Dennis, supra, n. 3.
33 Keeler, Eaddy and Zapata, supra, n. 2; Wilwording, supra, n. 10.
34 Keeler, supra n. 2 at 409.
35 Or in a more rights-conscious vein, reasonability, see: Keeler, Eaddy, Shaw dis-
sent, supra a. 2; Brooks, supra n. 2; Dennis, supra n. 3.
36 Sharpe, supra n. 2; Du Bose, supra n. 7; Atkins v. State, 210 S. 2d 9 (Fla. 1968),
cert. den. 218 S. 2d 748 (Fla. 1969).
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processes render the effect of such a charge questionable, despite the
best intentions of the judge and the jury.
Evidence presented at trial must be competent, probative and rel-
evant.3 7 The defendant is entitled to a cloak of innocence, supra, free
from appearance of guilt.38 It is unreasonable to presume that a de-
fendant in a prison uniform does not create the possibility of in-
jurious surmise. The criminal process should not allow the chance of
injurious suggestion to exist. This would seem to be one area which
presents little or no difficulty in removing the "chance" factor-simply
do not allow defendants to appear in prisoners' attire.
The seriousness of the Fifth Amendment violation is inescapable.
It is the defendant who is directly involved, beyond his control and
usually contrary to his wishes. The danger of incrimination is patent-
many defendants request permission to wear other clothing, by way of
pre-trial procedures,39 objections during trial,40 and post-trial objections
and appeals,41 with courts responding variously.42 The fact remains that
any exposure of the uniform-garbed defendant to the jury can produce
prejudice. The amount of time involved in the exposure should be an
irrelevant concern though courts have considered it on the way to find-
ing non-prejudicial defendants' appearances before veniremen and
jurors. 4 3 It does not take a juror long to make subconscious conclusions
when exposed to a prison garbed defendant. Hence the exposure could
be minimal, but the results maximal.
The right not to be a witness against one's self is not an unimportant
or collateral right. It is the right which more than any other places
the duty on the prosecution to prove its case, which is the basis of
an accusatorial system of justice. If by calling a practice procedural
rather than substantive a basic right can be denied, then truly the
ideals of the Constitution are cast aside and judicially overruled. So
here again the substantive nature of the right must prevail over pro-
cedural considerations. A travesty upon the Constitution would other-
wise result. However, this is not to imply that proper application of
procedural process, neither arbitrary nor discretionary, could not be
valid in control of such right.
37 Brooks and Keeler, supra, n. 2.
38 See cases cited supra, n. 2.
39 Keeler, supra n. 2; Collins, supra n. 11.
40 See cases cited, supra n. 11.
41 See cases cited, supra n. 9.
42 Allowed: Keeler, supra n. 2; Hendrick, supra, n. 8; Wilwording, supra, n. 10; Gar-
cia, supra, n. 3. Refused: Social Services and Watt, supra n. 3; Brooks, supra n. 2;
Shaw, supra, n. 2; Collins, supra n. 11. Change at court's insistence: Thomas, supra,
n. 4.




The right of the defendant not to incriminate himself is in no way
to be disregarded, or, where the right is violated, excused, simply be-
cause the jury would find out anyway that the defendant was im-
prisoned.44 The defendant's imprisonment could be due to various ir-
relevant factors. For instance, it could be that defendant could not
raise enough money for bond, or that he was previously convicted of a
separate, unrelated crime. Each separate trial for each separate crime
should guarantee the defendant the same protection and rights in each
instance.
Hence the Fifth Amendment properly should not be one which
courts can use to justify and rationalize irregular practices which, in
effect, are violations of substantive constitutional rights. It is unclear
why many courts continue to sanction such practices. The only clear
result is that constitutional rights of the defendant are thereby usurped.
Practical Implications
Although mere practical considerations should not control the recog-
nition and acquiescence in constitutional rights, nevertheless it is use-
ful to look at the practical implications.
Just as the jury can be waived,45 the right to appear in civilian
clothing at trial should be a waivable right. However this should not
be viewed as having a procedural basis, but rather a constitutional basis.
The present difficulty surrounding the matter is largely one of various
courts recognizing various applications of the right. Why can't the right
be waived in the same manner in which a jury is waived? 46 Once waived,
the right becomes essentially irretrievable but this is not objectionable
where the right is clearly presented and clearly waived. Cases have
dealt with defendants claiming that their right to appear in "innocent"
clothing was denied even though no jury was involved.47 The courts
involved found no prejudice; this appears to be the proper view since
the right viewed here is based to a large degree on the right to an
impartial jury and a surrounding idea that the judge is not susceptible to
the same suggestive conviction wielded by prison uniforms. A ques-
tion regarding waiver can be raised by challenging the competency of
counsel and settling such a charge by a defendant should not be such a
vexatious problem. There is no reason for vexatious result.
A second question is, who should supply clothing for defendants who
do not wish to waive the right but have no acceptable clothing? In-
44 The point is discussed both pro and con: Sharpe, supra n. 2; French and Garcia,
supra n. 3; Wilwording, supra n. 10; People v. Jones, 10 Cal. App. 3d 237, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 871 (1970); State v. Naples, 94 Ohio App. 33, app. dism., 158 Ohio St. 231 (1952);
State v. Alton, 365 P. 2d 527 (Sup. Ct. Mont. 1961).
45 Adams v. U.S., 317 U.S. 269, 63 S. Ct. 236, 87 L. ed. 268 (1942).
46 Timmons v. State, 223 Ga. 450, 156 S.E. 2d 68 (1967).
47 Social Services, supra, n. 3; Zapata, supra n. 2.
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trinsic to this problem is the question of what is "acceptable" clothing?
The problem may conceivably extend to style, etc.; it is then that dis-
cretion has a role to play in the matter. Or, this question may lead to
claims by indigents that their own clothing is of such condition that they
are too shabby or otherwise unsightly. The case of Thomas v. State
4 s
dealt with such a situation. Whether the court should be required to go
as far as the Keeler 49 court suggests, that the court itself try to locate
suitable clothing for defendant, is another matter. However, it would
not be a difficult situation to resolve once uniform application of rights
is established. It is well to look to the problems which may arise but
that is no reason for denying a right. Practical details can always be
worked out.
Conclusion
A general statement of the law is as follows:
Since the defendant, pending and during his trial, is still presumed
innocent, he is entitled to be brought before the court with the
appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man,
except as the necessary safety and decorum of the court may other-
wise require. He is therefore entitled to wear civilian clothes
rather than prison clothing at his trial. It is improper to bring
him into the presence of the jury which is to try him, or the venire
from which his trial jury will be drawn, clothed as a convict.50
It should be noted that this general statement does not base its claim
on constitutional grounds, because the "law" is based on court opin-
ions, which in general have not found results of prison uniforms to
be prejudicial to defendantsl with notable exceptions. 52 It can only
be hoped that the inherent constitutional problem involved is soon rec-
ognized, for it should be on such a base that the right is recognized, pro-
tected and applied.
48 Thomas, supra, n. 4.
49 Keeler, supra, n. 2.
50 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law § 239.
51 Sharpe and Shaw, supra, n. 2; Watt, French, Garcia, Xanthull and Woods, supra
n. 3; Yates, supra, n. 6; Clark and Du Bose, supra, n. 7; Bentley and Hendrick, supra,
n. 8; Claxton and Wilkinson, supra, n. 9; Wilwording, supra, n. 10; Collins, supra, n.
11; Jones and Alton, supra n. 44; People v. Thomas, 1 Mich. App. 118, 134 N.W. 2d
352 (1965); Rose v. State, 450 P. 2d 527 (Okla. 1969); People v. Romo, 64 Cal. Rptr.
151 (1967).
52 Keeler and Eaddy, supra n. 2; Dennis, supra, n. 3; Brooks, supra, n. 2.
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